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Abstract: This study, which acknowledges Twitter as an urban space where social interactions 
take place, also perceives “echo-chamber” problem as “voluntary ghettoization” and aims to 
describe it in association with “self-disclosure” concept, which means disclosure of cultural, 
political, or ethnic identities via the symbols that refer to them. Therefore, adopting cyber 
ethnography technique, the symbols encountered on participants’ Twitter profile pages have 
been documented and the followers of the participants have been analyzed correlatively. It has 
been determined that the users disclose their identities, form more homogeneous and ghetto-
like networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Internet, social media, and social networking sites (SNSs), which were emerged as 
hopes against fragmentation related to identities of the city or the mass media, and 
which took on the task of the restoration of the public sphere, seem to reproduce all 
this fragmentation today. These fragmentations are often discussed by the concepts 
such as “echo-chambers” or “balkanization”, however, since the SNSs are not only tools 
of media but also domains where social interactions take place, they might be 
perceived pursuant to the social, urban, and interaction theories. Here emerges the 
“cyber voluntary ghetto” concept which perceives the homogeneous networks formed 
by SNS users as homogeneous neighborhoods, which are exact opposites of the 
“public.” Similar to the spatial “ghettos” or “gated communities”, cyber ghettos are also 
about identities, cultural, political, or ethnic groups, and formed highly associated with 
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the “disclosure” or “presentation” of these identities with the “symbols” that refer to 
them. 
 
This study mainly aims to describe the association between “self-disclosure” and 
“ghettoization” within the SNS called Twitter, which might be acknowledged quite 
“public” among its kind. Hence, the study firstly establishes a framework with both 
social and media theories. Thereafter, adopting qualitative methods and cyber 
ethnography technique, the study first describes the symbols encountered (since the 
Turkish Twitter users have highly symbolic profile pages), secondly describes “self-
disclosure” attempts, and finally demonstrates cyber voluntary ghettos within Turkish 
users. It must be noted that this study does not have a representative sample and only 
aims to describe the current situation. 
 
2. Twitter as a Sociable Public Sphere 
The concept of "public sphere", which has been discussed for many years by numerous 
disciplines, is perceived and described in many other ways. Besides the primary 
meaning of the concept, which is "being open to everyone", it also refers to a domain 
where political or social, collective or individual vis-a-vis interactions take place. 
However, in the media and communication studies, the concept is often perceived that 
it only covers organized political actions and rational debates, thanks to the liberal 
theories and Habermas' conceptualization.  
 
According to liberal theories, which are known with the theoreticians such as J. Locke, 
J. S. Mill, the public/private distinction should be between state administration and 
market economy, in other words, "public" means "government", government's policies, 
and debates about "general interest" which is principally government's interests 
(Weintraub, 1997: 7-8). The media as a liberal public sphere takes on the task of 
"informing the citizens" transparently about the policies (or debates about the policies) 
of the government, and simply put, the informed citizens may choose the best policies 
for them. As understood, no vis-a-vis interaction plays part in this theory, citizens may 
only follow the previously chosen "interactions" from media, and most of these 
interactions are organized political. 
 
On the other hand, Habermas (1974) has separated the "public sphere" from state or 
government, envisioned it as a domain between state and private economy (p. 50), and 
also considered vis-a-vis interactions, yet these interactions are principally political 
intentional or performed by organized political groups. Moreover, according to 
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Habermas, "public" means "general interests" alike the liberal theories claim, while they 
are not the interests of the governments but "common" interests of "private" people. As 
he puts it: "Citizens behave as a public body when they confer ... about matters of 
general interest" (p. 49). 
 
There are also theories that do not perceive "public" as "general interests" still refer to 
principally political interactions, which may not be required to be "organized". Arendt 
(1998), for instance, acknowledges "public" equal to "political" while "household" equal 
to "private", with the words: "The distinction between a private and public sphere of life 
corresponds to the household and the political realms" (p. 28), however, she puts 
conflicts forward rather than "rational debates" or "compromise" by defining the public 
sphere as a domain "where one could excel, could distinguish oneself from all others" 
(p. 49). Likewise, the feminist, Marxist or poststructuralist, that is to say, counter-
public theoreticians also acknowledge "public" equal to "political", yet aim to redefine 
dominant public/private distinction (Weintraub, 1997: 27-33). They perceive "private" 
as neither "household" nor "non-government", but claim that the household is also 
"public", therefore political. Within the idea of "personal is political", as Fraser (1990) 
puts it; "assumptions that were previously exempt from contestation will now have to 
be publicly argued out" (p. 67). As is seen, both Arendt and counter-public 
theoreticians refer to vis-a-vis interactions, which do not need to include compromise 
efforts, yet are performed by organized political intentions.  
 
In substance, except liberal theories, all other public sphere narratives refer to vis-a-
vis interactions. However, is "public sphere" required to cover only political interactions 
that are often performed by (or in associated with) organized or macro political 
groups? Against all these "organized political" narratives there stands sociable public 
sphere narrative, which is about the domain where vis-a-vis (or micro) casual social 
interactions and everyday life practices take place. "Its domain lies, after all, in the 
public space of street, park, and plaza -but also of neighborhood, bar, and café" 
(Weintraub, 1997: 23). All these "casual" interactions do not have to be "non-political", 
on the contrary, if "the personal is political" as the counter-public theoreticians claim, 
these interactions are probably political, however, they may not politically intentional. 
People, that navigate the streets, parks, and plazas of the city (that is to say, "public 
sphere") encounter (ocular) or occasionally interact (discursive) with each other, 
therefore, construct and reconstruct both themselves and the social setting. Social 
practices and significations are created by casual interactions, as Göle (2002: 176) puts 
it: "As a social imaginary, the public sphere works in a social field and penetrates and 
blends into cultural significations." 
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For sure, in both political and sociable perspectives, the public sphere is highly 
associated with heterogeneity, differences, and different social, cultural, ethnic, 
ideological, economic groups. Without different social groups or world-views exist, 
neither political "rational debates", "excellence attempts" and "struggles to be visible" 
are significant nor are the new significations created through casual interactions. In 
Arendt's (1998) words: "Action, ... corresponds to the human condition of plurality" (p. 
7), without "plurality" there would be no "action". The city, where the sociable public 
domain mainly lies, is also described with heterogeneity almost by all urban 
theoreticians. As Sennett (2002) simply puts it: city "... is a human settlement in which 
strangers are likely to meet" (p. 39).  
 
Returning to the subject, as is mentioned, the public sphere concept is often perceived 
that it only covers organized political actions and rational debates especially in the 
media and communication studies, however, it may -even it must- be perceived by its 
sociable means. Normatively, internet, social media, and SNSs are public spheres for 
sure since they are open to and reachable by everyone. Moreover, there are numerous 
discussions whether SNSs (or Twitter) are kind of public spheres or not, which often 
adopt liberal theories or Habermas' concepts (Rasmussen, 2014; Schafer, 2015). What 
is more, Fuchs (2014) criticizes the theoreticians such as Papacharissi or Castells for 
concentrating on cultural/political communication and ignoring political-economic 
aspects of the cyber public spheres, even if they principally focused on freedom of 
political expressions through the internet. There are also numerous studies that adopt 
counter-public theories and focus on the visibility attempts of the "sub-classes" 
through the internet or SNSs in the context of "digital activism" (Saka, 2012). By any 
means, there are fewer studies that perceive the internet and SNSs as sociable public 
spheres, which is a perspective is not principally political but also does not have to 
exclude all political actions. This is a perspective that acknowledges the internet and 
SNSs as cities, which consist of squares, streets, and of course neighborhoods, where 
cyber vis-a-vis encounters or interactions take place, and significations or social 
setting created. 
 
Eventually, "Cyber-space architecture is very similar to the physical architecture", "SNSs 
imitate real everyday life" and "Vis-a-vis interactions are often replaced by online 
interactions" (Çomu & Halaiqa, 2015: 30), therefore, cyber public spheres may be 
interpreted pursuant to urban, interaction, and everyday life theories and analogies. 
Furthermore, there are also a couple of media or internet theoreticians who consider 
especially the social interactions within the concept of public sphere. For instance, 
Keane (1995: 8) defines the public sphere as "relationship between to or more people, 
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usually connected by certain means of communication ..., in which nonviolent 
controversies erupt." Similarly, Dahlgren (2005: 148) claims "public sphere is ... a 
constellation of communicative spaces ... that permit the circulation of information, 
ideas, debates" and while categorizing it in dimensions, describes the "dimension of 
interaction" with everyday life practices. 
 
Twitter, is not only a macro, liberal, or Habermasian public sphere, since it shines out 
during political movements (Eren, 2015; Korkmaz, 2015), is a medium that citizen are 
informed "transparently" about politics, and a domain where macro political debates 
may take place through "trending topics" table (Malkoç, 2018), but also a micro or 
sociable public sphere, since its users may encounter (ocularly) or interact 
(discursively) with the other users, that are similar to them or not, while navigating its 
heterogeneous cyber squares, streets or homogeneous cyber neighborhoods, 
therefore, they construct or reconstruct themselves, significations, life practices, and 
the social setting. 
 
3. Twitter Profile Pages: Self Presentation or Self-Disclosure 
One of the arch dichotomies of the concept of the public sphere is the dichotomy of 
the "collectivity" and "visibility" (Weintraub, 1997: 5), which is again associated with 
private/ public distinction. While the "collectivity" notion refers to the rational debates 
and compromise, the "visibility" notion is about the struggles of the people who 
previously excluded from public sphere. While the theoreticians of "collectivity" claim 
that individual (that is to say "private") aspects or interest should be kept away from 
the public sphere since they prevent compromise and even interactions, the 
theoreticians of "visibility" oppose this idea and claim "private" aspects are also "public" 
since they previously had been suppressed. 
 
"Collectivity" notion is represented by liberal and Habermasian theories. As mentioned 
before, liberal theories simply advocate that subjects that are not about the state or 
macro politics should be kept away from public sphere. Similarly, Habermas (1974), 
who imagines the public sphere between the state and private economy, pushes 
individual interests or aspects into the background by defining the public sphere as "... 
a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed" (p. 49); "opinion" here, is related to the lifestyle of a person, while "public 
opinion" is "general opinion" constituted by the opinion owners through rational 
debates (1991: 90-95). On the other hand, "Visibility" notion is represented by 
counter-public or Arendt's theories, as mentioned before, Arendt perceives public 
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sphere in association with "excellence" and "to be distinguished from others." Similarly, 
Fraser (1990: 67), who is a counter-public theoretician, defines "subaltern counter 
publics" as the domain of "Members of the subordinated social groups-women, 
workers, people of color, and gays and lesbians" which produce "counter discourses", 
and encourages them to be visible in the "public" with all their differences. 
 
Recall that, these visibility and collectivity narratives often refer to organized political 
groups, while sociable public sphere narratives refer to casual interactions that are 
independent of political organizations' intentions but may also be performed by 
individual political intentions. For instance, Göle (2002) points to Muslim women, who 
may be acknowledged as people excluded from the dominant public sphere at least for 
Europe or USA, and perceives their existence in public with their headscarves on as 
visibility attempts. These attempts are political for sure, but they are also individual, 
casual, and construct social setting "naturally." 
 
As is understood, public sphere of the city "provides a stage for performance rather 
than an abstract frame for textual and discursive practices, the ocular aspect in the 
creation of significations ... becomes of utmost importance" (p. 177). According to 
Simmel (1997), in the modern world the eyes have won out over the ears, "the 
individuals see each other ... but cannot speak" (p. 117) In other words, people 
encountering today are looking at each other rather than listening to, and individual 
aspects or interests are mostly presented or disclosed via visual (ocular) symbols 
rather than aural (discursive). Here the "symbol" concept should be described. Goffman 
(1990) described the information about an individual -who is of course not only an 
"individual" considering the cultural, political or economic milieu s/he dwells- as 
"social information" and called the signs that convey social information as "symbols" 
(pp. 58-59). Symbols mostly refer to social groups, political stances, ethnic origins, 
nations, religious beliefs, etc., In Simmel's (1898) words; "the coherence of the group 
... attaches itself to a material symbol" (p. 675), and no interpretations are required to 
discover what they refer to. 
 
Symbols are agents of self-presentation. Goffman (1956), who perceives social 
interactions as playacting, called the "part of the individual's performance ... functions 
to define the situation for those who observe" (p. 13) as "front", and underlined that 
individuals design these fronts, the spaces (settings) or their bodies (personal fronts), 
with the most appropriate symbols to present themselves and get favourable 
impressions (pp. 66-70). "Self-presentation" notion is not a critical approach and only 
provides a method to analyze vis-a-vis interaction processes, while Sennett's 
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"self/personality disclosure" concept may be perceived as a criticism of public sphere 
mentality of the post-modern era. Sennett's concept is based on his historical 
perspective. 
 
According to Sennett (2002) the 18th-century bourgeois city provided an "anonymous" 
and "public" scene where "strangers" were perceived not as threats but as a natural 
part of urban life, and "general interests" perceived far more important than individual 
interests. Sennett, alike Goffman, acknowledged the bourgeois city as a theater scene 
whose citizens are "public" actors; "There is nonetheless a strong relationship between 
stage and street" (p. 38). The actors, to maintain the theatre (that is to say "public 
interactions"), appeared on the stage by putting on their "social masks" which hide 
their individual interests, personalities or identities behind. These masks were not 
about tricking the others but functioned as bridge builders between the actors, and 
"This bridge, in turn, gave men the means to be sociable, on impersonal grounds" (p. 
64). The 18th-century bourgeoisie had a "body as mannequin", wore tailored clothes, 
and "speech as sign", interacted with a civic and gentle language; "Both visual and 
verbal principles therefore sharpen a definition of 'public' expression: it is anti-
symbolic" (p. 87). In other words, alike Habermas, Sennett idealizes the 18th-century 
bourgeoisie, who did not disclose their private life, intimacy, and personalities for the 
maintenance of the public life and general interests, on that sense, he is a "collectivity" 
theoretician. He also mentions a distinction between "presenting" and "representing"; 
while "presenting" means being behind a social mask, hiding individual aspects, 
"representing" means taking off the mask and disclosing personality, which is related 
to social, cultural, political, ethnic groups the person belongs and erodes the public 
sphere (p. 42). 
 
The 18th-century city, where personalities and personal interests were hidden behind 
"social masks" for the maintenance of interactions and "rational" debates, would be 
"modernize" in the beginning of the 20th-century and have a "grey" climate where 
neither personalities nor the interactions or debates exist. Simmel (1971) noted that 
the metropolis "... has outgrown every personal element" (pp. 337). As it is known; in 
the modern society and city, traditional, communal, and close ties have eroded, while 
rationalism, money, and calculability have risen, and the people losing their community 
bonds to maintain their individual interests have merged in a flat and "grey" 
appearance (p. 329), alienated, or turned into "strangers." "We live among strangers, 
among whom we are strangers ourselves" (Bauman & May, 2001: 39). The modern 
people of the 20th-century, who broke free from their bonds at first, would start to 
fear to live among strangers, seek the ways of "escaping from freedom", and try to sew 
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new bonds in the mid-20th-century (Fromm, 1965). However, in the postmodern era, 
both the city and the society lost their "grey" and anonymous character, while 
heterogeneity and difference emerged as "liberative forces" (Harvey, 1990: 9). People 
with their new bonds, that is to say, identities, have started to "freely" disclose 
themselves. 
 
Sennett (2002) tracks the roots of identity or personality disclosure problem at the 
beginning of the 19th-century. According to Sennett, while the citizens of the 18th-
century city did not disclose their personal differences each other at the first place; in 
the 19th-century they lost these aspects due to cities' growing economy and 
population (pp. 141-146). Standardization of mass production objects (that is to say 
"uniformity of objects", decreasing options, and certain objects that become obtainable 
by certain classes/groups only) have put the selves/personalities/identities ahead and 
made "playacting" unnecessary, "As the images become more monochromatic, people 
began to take them more seriously, as signs of the personality of the wearer" (p. 164). 
Thus, people started to discover each other's social classes, identities or personalities 
via their appearances, and the once "anti-symbolic" bourgeois city has been invaded by 
the symbols that refer to identities or personalities. This has led to today's society, 
which is defined as "intimate society" by Sennett, and based on identity or personality 
disclosure (p. 29). 
 
Returning to subject, could Twitter profile pages be perceived in consideration of "self-
presentation" and "personality disclosure" concepts? Since Twitter is acknowledged in 
this study as a sociable public sphere and associated with the spaces of city such as 
squares, streets, and neighborhoods, it is likely to say, the profile pages are faces, 
clothes, rooms, office tables, in Goffman's terms "settings" or "personal fronts" of the 
users, who navigate this cyber-city. Users present themselves by designing these cyber 
"fronts", their cover and profile pictures with the most appropriate symbols to get 
favorable impressions, that is to say "followers" and "likes." Or perhaps, in Sennett's 
term, they do not "present" but "represent" themselves (the social, cultural, political, 
ethnic groups they belong to), and also not wear their "social masks" but wear 
"community masks." And here the main problem of this study emerges, do personality 
disclosure on the SNS profile pages cause cyber ghettoization, that may be 
acknowledged as users belong to similar (or same) social groups dwell in the same 
network? However, for sure, the disclosure attempts could also be acknowledged as 
"visibility" attempts, as the struggles of "excellence" or "counter-public." 
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4. The Echo-Chambers or Cyber Voluntary Ghettos within Twitter 
The problem, which may be described as fragmentation of the internet users from 
different cultural, ethnic groups, economic classes, have different political stances or 
ideologies, support different sports clubs, like different music or literature genres, or 
as the users ignore the others due to the homogeneous networks they form, has been 
discussed by numerous researchers or theoreticians within the concepts such as 
"echo-chambers", "homophily", "balkanization", and "polarization."  However, the 
problem is hardly discussed in the context of urban or everyday life theories, despite 
this perspective might be remarkably effective to acknowledge the causes or processes 
of this fragmentation. Since Twitter has been acknowledged in this study as a sociable 
public sphere and with the analogies refer to the city, it is likely to say, the networks 
users form might be perceived as homogeneous neighborhoods, and the trending 
topic table, for instance, might be perceived as a heterogeneous city center. As 
mentioned above, users navigate these cyber neighborhoods and city centers with their 
cover and profile pictures by "disclosing" themselves with the "symbols" they use to 
design these "fronts." Might all these "echo-chamber", "balkanization", "polarization", 
or let us say "ghettoization" problems be related to the "disclosure" problem? 
 
Actually, the historical processes the city and the internet go through, that comes from 
anonymity and goes to the identity disclosure, are quite similar. The city, that provided 
a public scene in 18th-century as Sennett claims, and "grey" and anonymous at the 
beginning of the 20th-century as Simmel mentions, has lost its both anonymous and 
public character and heterogeneity and difference emerged as "liberative forces" since 
the mid-20th-century as Harvey notes. In the 20th-century city started to overflow 
with "strangers", and according to Sennett (2002), the people chose to become 
"intimate" and "local" to escape from strangers and alienation (p. 295). Describing the 
20th-century city as a "life among the strangers", Bauman (2001: 46-47) also points 
out that people needed shelters, that are "familiarity" and "security" of the 
communities, from "the stranger." Seeking for familiars among the stranger means 
seeking "people of us", and finding those of us could likely be possible when they 
disclose "with whom they are", the social, cultural, political, ethnic groups they belong 
to, and this process often functions on a symbolic domain. Only seeking or trying to 
find "familiars", the "people of us", has eventually caused certain social groups to settle 
in certain spaces/regions of the city and the city has been divided/fragmented 
between identities. For sure, this process cannot be reduced to "preferences"; In the 
early 20th-century, city centers, where immigrants and sub-economic classes lived 
before, have got converted into economic centers, gentrified, and sub-classes have got 
50 İsmail Burak Malkoç 
 
isolated outer regions of cities (Alver, 2007: 24-38). The isolated different social 
groups, immigrants, were associated with crime, and their surroundings have been 
tried to close further, and the concept of "ghetto" came forth. 
 
The ghetto concept primarily explains the spaces that have occurred with the 
immigration process, and a ghetto is a place that represents a homogenized culture 
closed to outside (p. 67). Bauman (2001) also refers to the concept of "closure"; "A 
ghetto ... combines spatial confinement with social closure" (p. 116) and "Ghettos are 
places from which their insiders cannot get out" (p. 117) However, in the end of 20th-
century the course of the fragmentation of the city between identities has changed and 
ghetto became "voluntary"; "Crime, crowd, insecurity ... shows that the spatial 
fragmentation is a necessity" (Alver, 2007: 105) and the middle-upper classes have 
started to close themselves to "gated communities" to escape from insecurity, for sure 
in accordance with their identities. This new closure, which Alver defines as "the 
ghettos of the rich" (p. 68), is conceptualized by Bauman (2011: 117) as "voluntary 
ghettos" which aim to "bar outsiders from going in". Voluntary or involuntary, "The 
ghetto strictly reflects exclusion, closure, and homogeneity" (Alver, 2007: 69). The 
ghetto means "separation in lieu of the negotiation of life in common" (Bauman, 2001: 
115). The ghetto means being "local" and "intimate", bears only "homogeneity" 
meaning of the community; in Sennett's (2002) words, "the purge of those who don't 
really belong becomes the community's business" (p. 261) In the ghetto, "community 
masks" becomes far more important than "social masks"; "The mask reveals a common 
mask; ... the faces of all to be recognizable in this common face, it must remain rigid 
and still" (p. 250). 
 
When it comes to the mid-90s; the mass media has been fragmented, that is to say 
"tribalized" through identities (Morley & Robbins, 1995), therefore, the people have 
ignored the media that they do not belong to, and also the common areas of the city 
have diminished, therefore, the people have started to interact only with the "people of 
them" without even -being able to- leaving their neighborhoods. When that 
"publicless" atmosphere ruled, the internet and the social media have emerged as new 
tools and were seen as hopes and alternatives where one takes off her/his "community 
mask", interacts freely, and does not need to seek for "security", so that, the public life 
would have been restored (Timisi, 2005). For sure, these hopes are associated with the 
early anonymous atmosphere of the Internet, which is quite similar to the cities of 
20th-century. 
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In this early period of the Internet, identities were able to be reconstructed merely by 
the language and eluded the biological symbols such as sex, origin, skin color that 
constructs them (pp. 97-102). This anonymity, which is similar to the Sennett's "social 
mask" concept, was approved due to its potential to form virtual communities where 
everyone is equal. The "virtual community" narrative imagined a community that is 
disconnected from the social context. As Rheingold (1993, introduction) puts it "Virtual 
communities are social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people 
carry on those public discussions long enough." With this definition, Rheingold refers 
only to a group of random people who simply gathered on the internet. 
 
In the mid-2000's, SNSs founded, therefore, being anonymous has become a marginal 
preference rather than the norm, and anonymous users have begun to be perceived as 
"strangers" or "insecure" people as in Bauman's narratives. Within the SNSs, users 
started to desire to show their faces since this environment "encourages users to 
upload a profile photo" (Boyd & Ellison, 2007: 211). In other words, with SNSs, people 
took off their "social masks", put on their identity masks, and started to disclose their 
personalities. In Goffman's terms, the physical fronts consist of set, decors and 
costumes has been replaced by the cyber-fronts consist of profile pages and variety of 
symbols placed on them as accessories.  
 
Narratives of the loss of anonymity are mostly about the real names and faces, that is 
to say, "formal" identities, which are carried to the internet, however, the "identity" is 
also highly associated with "with whom the person is." In other words, disclosure of 
identity is also disclosure of the cultural backgrounds, the political stances, the ethnic 
origins, etc. SNS users have not only disclosed their real identities but they have also 
carried their offline environments and communities to online due to the architecture of 
the SNSs. As Boyd & Ellison point out SNSs "enable users to ... make visible their social 
networks" (p. 211). In other words, the concept of "virtual community", which was a 
community disconnected from the social context, has changed with SNSs and the 
internet has started to host "real" communities. Here; it should not be forgotten that 
the "real" communities had already been "ghettoized" in the context of the city or 
"tribalized" in the context of the media. 
  
For sure, these "cyber communities" are not permitted only to those who are known 
offline and may expand with new "followers". These new followers would probably be 
the people who are similar to users' offline friends. Moreover, in the mid-2000's the 
internet environment started to overflow with the anonymous "strangers", similar to 
the 20th-century city, and the users become "local" or "intimate" to escape from the 
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strangers and alienation as Sennett stated, or started to see their own familiar 
networks as "shelters" as Bauman narrated. In other words, also for the internet users, 
the "security need" mentioned by Alver re-emerged, and the solution was choosing to 
"live" among the similar ones again. As Van Dijk (2006) puts it internet users would 
"invite particular people to withdraw into computer communication ... to interact only 
with safe, self-chosen social environments" (p. 3). Seeking for familiarity among the 
stranger means seeking "people of us", and finding those of us could only be possible 
when they disclose "with whom they are", and this process often functions on a 
symbolic domain of profile pages. Today, it is observed that anonymity returns to the 
internet; the "real" faces and names may be more hidden than the times when the SNSs 
founded, however, the symbols of cultural backgrounds, ethnic origins, political 
stances, that is to say, symbols of "with whom the people are" take up more space on 
the profile pages than before. Today's SNS user constructs and expands her/his 
personal network with the users who disclose that they are "similar to her/him" by a 
variety of symbols, and keeps the others away as much as possible. Schmidt (2014) 
describes this phenomenon with the concepts of "personal publics" or "do-it-yourself 
publics." 
 
Here comes the idea of the "cyber voluntary ghetto". If the ghetto reflect "exclusion", 
"closure" and "homogeneity"; these do-it-yourself networks are perceived as 
reflections of existing spatial ghettos. In other words, pursuant to Sennett and 
Bauman's concepts, the cyber voluntary ghetto is also about closure, purge of the 
others, barring and homogenization, and is also a kind of "cyber-localization" or 
"cyber-intimate society." In cyber ghetto, the "community masks" gets important, not 
the "social masks"; if the faces of all to be recognizable in this common "cyber-face", it 
must remain rigid and still. While the internet and SNSs were seen as hopes against 
spatial "ghettoization" or "tribalization" of the mass media and took on the task of the 
restoration of the "public sphere", they seem to reproduce all these fragmentations in 
the cyber-space today. While the "public sphere" is about heterogeneity, about 
"rational debates" or the "visibility" struggles of the different social groups in its 
political means, and about "signification" creation through the interactions of different 
social groups, these cyber ghetto-like homogeneous networks of today could be 
anything except "public."  
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5. Methods 
5.1. Research Model 
 This study aims to generate data and describe personality disclosure, profile pages 
that are "fronts" and "symbols" that are accessories of this disclosure, and to examine 
whether this disclosure associated with cyber voluntary ghettoization or not, within the 
SNS called Twitter. Therefore, this study is a descriptive research that focuses on the 
question "how" rather than "why", and "presents a picture of the specific details of a 
situation, social setting, or relationship." (Neuman, 2014: 38-39). This study also 
adopts qualitative methods that aim to present and classify the qualitative data 
collected "by looking at the experiences of individuals within their everyday life 
practices" (Kümbetoğlu, 2012: 34-46).  
 
5.2. Sampling 
The study analyzes profile pages of the Twitter users and the symbols located there to 
describe the identity disclosure, and followers of the Twitter users to describe cyber 
ghettoization, therefore, it is "user-centered" (not "content-based") research. The 
study is not about a specific group on Twitter, in other words, its population could be 
considered as all "Twitter users in Turkey", which are about 14 million (We Are Social, 
2016, slide 459). It is certain that analyzing random users encountered within Twitter 
generates insignificant data. After all, similar to the cities Twitter also consists of 
neighborhoods, even ghettos, that is to say, personal networks, therefore, to generate 
significant data and results it is necessary to analyze these different users and the 
networks they "live" in. Although the study does not aim to be representative, due to 
having the purposes to reach to the different identities on Twitter, the different 
symbolic presentations of these identities, the different symbols, and the different 
cyber ghettos have adopted purposive sampling method and tried to sample as many 
different participants as possible. To such sample; it has been determined to select the 
participants among the followers of Twitter accounts of Turkish newspapers that have 
distinctly different audiences; considering that the people polarized regard to the 
newspapers they read, and the newspaper accounts are the most followed institutional 
Twitter accounts in Turkey. 
 
On October 10, 2017, participants selected among followers of the Twitter accounts of 
the Turkish newspapers BirGün ( @Birgun_Gazetesi ), Sözcü ( @gazetesozcu ) and Yeni 
Akit ( @Yeniakit ), which have distinctly different audiences, and on October 22, 2017, 
to represent a more "common" sphere, the followers of the Twitter account of the 
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Hürriyet newspaper ( @Hurriyet ) have been added to the sample.* Another issue is the 
criteria determined to select the participants; 1- To find the users, who are familiar 
with Twitter, accounts that have been active for at least 6 months have been scanned; 
2- To find mediocre Twitter users, accounts that have followers between minimum 50 
and maximum 1500 have been scanned; 3- To find users who are active enough and 
declare their own opinions, accounts tweeted (which is not a retweet) at least once in 
the previous week have been scanned; 4- Since the study has focused on "symbolic 
fronts" of Twitter and analyzed the "symbols" on profile pages, accounts with at least 
one image on their profile pages have been scanned. While scanning the followers of 
the newspapers' Twitter accounts, each newspaper's first forty (40) followers that 
match the criteria (160 user accounts in sum) were followed by the research account. 
Twenty-eight (28) users who did not want to participate has left the study, as they 
were informed before, by blocking the research account, and the remaining 132 
participants have formed the sample. 
 
Table 1. Participants and the Sample Groups 
 Sample Groups (Newspaper Accounts) 
SUM Hürriyet 
@Hurriyet 
Yeni Akit 
@yeniakit 
Sözcü 
@gazetesozcu 
BirGün 
@BirGun_Gazetesi 
Count of 
Participants 
F 33 32 33 34 132 
% 25.0 24.24 25.0 25.76 100 
 
Table 1 shows the distributions of the 132 participants associated with the sample 
groups, a balanced distribution among the groups has been maintained. Moreover, 
participants have alphanumerically coded associated with the sample group they 
belong to (i.e. H3, A27, and S14). 
 
5.3. Data Collection Technique and Analysis 
The ethnographic method has been adopted to collect data for the study. The 
ethnographic method is an effort of describing a culture and understanding different 
styles of life, it "includes listening to and looking at the people. Data is noted down 
through field notes" (Alyanak, 2015: 118-119).  Malinowski, one of the founders of the 
ethnographic method, stated that everyday activities, clothing, wares, etc. of the 
                                                            
* The newspaper Sözcü, means "Spokesman" in English, is known with its republican, Kemalist, and 
nationalist tendencies. The newspaper BirGün, means "SomeDay" in English, is known with its left wing 
tendencies. The newspaper Yeni Akit, means "New Agreement" in English, is known with its Islamic religious 
and nationalist tendencies. And finally Hürriyet, means "Liberty" in English, is known as a mainstream 
newspaper, which has one of the most followed media accounts in Twitter, Turkey. 
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community observed/studied should also be noted down (p. 124). The clothing or the 
wares of the participants of the study, could be perceived as the symbols that they 
design their profile pages. It is necessary to mention here the method of "netnography" 
or "cyber ethnography." According to Kozinets, the founder of the method, 
netnography is a "qualitative research methodology that adapts ethnographic research 
techniques to study cultures and communities that are emerging through computer-
mediated communications" (Akturan, 2009: 6). 
 
The data of the study have been collected using the participatory observation 
technique of the ethnographic method; observation is defined as "to perceive and note 
down not only the momentary cases but also the cases that form patterns" 
(Kümbetoğlu, 2012:126), and observation notes and photographs are combined to put 
forth a "meaningful, detailed, holistic picture" (p.47). Accordingly; screenshots of all 
the participants' profile pages have been taken and all the "symbols" encountered have 
been noted down, counted, and grouped. This section aims to both describe Turkey's 
symbolic fronts of Twitter and demonstrate the symbols the researcher acknowledge 
as "symbols." Several examples of these symbols have been presented as qualitative 
findings. After, to reveal and describe the identity/personality disclosure on Twitter; 
participants have been categorized considering whether they use a real photograph 
(anonymous or not) and whether they have one of the symbols mentioned on their 
profile pages (with or without symbols). To extend the analysis, participants have been 
categorized as "Political Stance Declarers", "Sports Club Supporters" and 
"Vocational/Educational Declarers" considering the symbol groups they choose to 
design their profile pages. Finally, in order to describe the voluntary ghettoization on 
Twitter, firstly, the "Political Stance Declaration" category has been extended as 
"Republican Nationalists", "Conservative Nationalists", "Mere Nationalists", "Turkish 
Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Socialists/Anarchists", 
"Islamic Religionists" and adding the "Sports Club Supporters", "Vocational/Educational 
Declarations" and "Participants Without Symbols" categories, participants' followers 
have been scanned to reveal how many followers of the participants use the same 
symbol groups to design their profile pages, that is to say, how homogenous the cyber 
neighborhood -their personal network- the participants "live" in. In this final section, 
the sample has been reduced as stratified considering the categories mentioned above, 
and 28% of the participants have been examined.   
 
 
 
56 İsmail Burak Malkoç 
 
6. Findings and Comments 
6.1. Symbolic Fronts of Twitter 
"Symbols", that Simmel claimed that they refer to social groups, or Goffman described 
as conveyers of "social information"; are used for designing "settings" and "personal 
fronts" in Goffman's terms, but this time cyber fronts of profile pages. This study, just 
as an ethnography study that dive into a community and document locals' clothes and 
jewelleries, aims to document the visual or textual symbols that Twitter users design 
their profile pages with. The concept of "symbol" that the research adopts is shaped in 
the context of Sennett's concept of "identity/personality disclosure" and the symbols 
that refer to social, cultural, ethnic groups, religious beliefs, and political stances are 
documented. 
 
In this regard, most common symbols that have been encountered through 
participants' profile pages are shown in Table 2. A total of 341 symbols have been 
encountered and only 196 of them (about 57.5%) could be shown in the table. Also, the 
explanations of which symbols are counted within the categories are given in 
parentheses. While 34.3% of all the symbols that have been encountered are used by 
the participants that follow the BirGün newspaper, only 14.4% are used by the 
participants that follow the Hürriyet newspaper. As is seen, the Hürriyet newspaper, 
which was chosen to represent a more common domain, remarkably appears to serve 
as a "public" sphere.  
 
The most common symbol that the participants use on their profile pages is Turkish 
Flag with the count of 53 and 15.54% ratio. Turkish Flag is the national symbol of the 
Republic of Turkey, and it is not surprising to encounter it that much. Moreover, being 
a unifying symbol, this may also reinforce the hope of the public sphere. However, 
encountering 41.5% of the Flag among the participants that follow the Yeni Akit 
newspaper may shatter the hopes, since the symbol appears like belonging to a certain 
group. Several examples of The Turkish Flag symbols encountered are shown in Figure 
1 with the codes of the participants. 
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Table 2. Most Common Symbols Encountered 
SYMBOLS ENCOUNTERED 
COUNT 
% Sample Groups (Newspaper Acc.) 
SUM 
Hürri. Y.Akit Sözcü Birgün 
Turkish Flag F 6 22 11 14 
53 15.54 
% 11.32 41.51 20.75 26.42 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Founder of 
The Republic of Turkey)  
(Portrait or image; sign; image of 
Atatürk's mausoleum; writings such 
as "Atatürk", "Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk", "Atatürkçü", "Kemalist"; 
Kemalist mottos; Atatürk's 
quotations.) 
F 7 4 14 20 
45 13.20 
% 15.56 8.89 31.11 44.44 
Islamic Symbols (Sunni)  
(Writings or mottos that refer to the 
religion such as"İslam", "Müslüman", 
"Mümin", "Allah"; praying and verses 
in Turkish or Arabic; Images of 
mosques.) 
F 4 14 3 1 
22 6.45 
% 18.17 63.64 13.64 4.55 
Beşiktaş (a Turkish football club)  
(Images of club's coat of arm, shirt, 
stadium, colors; names or 
photographs of players; writings that 
refer to the club such as;  "BJK", 
"1903") 
F 3 1 - 16 
20 5.87 
% 15.0 5.0 - 80.0 
Fenerbahçe (a Turkish football club)  
(Images of club's coat of arm, shirt, 
stadium, colors; names or 
photographs of players; writings that 
refer to the club such as; 
"Fenerbahçe", "Fenerli", "1907") 
F 1 2 9 8 
20 5.87 
% 5.0 10.0 45.0 40.0 
Mere writings that refer to Turkish 
ethnicity or nationalism such as; 
"Turk", "Turkish", "Turkishness"  
F 1 4 6 8 
19 5.57 
% 5.26 21.05 31.58 42.11 
Galatasaray (a Turkish football club)  
(Images of club's coat of arm, shirt, 
stadium, colors; names or 
photographs of players; writings that 
refer to the club such as; 
"Galatasaray", "1905") 
F - 2 5 10 
17 4.99 
% - 11.80 29.40 58.80 
Sum Total 
F 49 87 88 117 
341 100 
% 14.4 25.5 25.8 34.3 
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Figure 1. Several Examples of Turkish Flag Symbols Encountered 
 
The second most common symbol type used by participants are symbols refer to 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is the founder of The Republic of Turkey, with the count 
of 45 and 13.2% ratio. Figure 2 shows several examples of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
symbols encountered on the profile pages of the participants and In Figure 3, several 
examples of sports club symbols encountered on the profile pages of the participants 
are shown together with the codes of the participants'.  
 
 
Figure 2. Several Examples of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Symbols Encountered 
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Figure 3. Several Examples of Sports Club Symbols Encountered 
 
Among all the symbols encountered; 5.87% of them refers to Beşiktaş football club, 
5.87% of them refer to Fenerbahçe football club and 4.99% percent of them refer to 
Galatasaray football club, adding this the 1.76% of the symbols that refer to the other 
football clubs, sports club symbol usage with the 18.5% ratio is beyond even Turkish 
Flag usage. Except for the symbols listed in Table 2; a total of 21 symbols that refer to 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Current president of The Republic of Turkey) and the Justice 
and Development Party, a total of 13 symbols refer to socialist ideology and a total of 
28 symbols that are declarations of vocation/education have been encountered. In 
addition, also symbols refer to Turkish and Kurdish nationalism/ethnicity with 
significant ratios have been encountered. Figure 4 shows all 341 symbols as grouped 
in the categories of "political symbols", "sports club symbols", "educational 
declarations" and "vocational declarations. 
 
As is seen, political symbol usage of Turkish Twitter users is pretty intense. Moreover, 
this part of the study revealed that Twitter users do not only use single kind of symbol, 
while they may both use different political symbols together to express their political 
stances, or use political, sports club, vocational, and educational symbols together to 
express (or disclose) their personalities/identities. 
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Figure 4. Categorical Distributions of the Symbols Encountered 
 
6.2. Personality or Identity Disclosure on Twitter 
The symbols, which refer to cultural, political, religious, ethnic groups, on SNS or 
Twitter profile pages could be analyzed considering Sennett's concept of 
"personality/identity disclosure" or Habermas' ideas about private interests are not 
public. These symbols have been demonstrated in the section before. Recall that, 
"personality disclosure" problem is also about "anonymity." In this regard, Table 3 
shows how many of the participants use their real photographs on their profile pages 
and how many of them are anonymous, associatively with the sample groups they have 
been selected.  
 
Table 3. Participants Who Are Anonymous or Use Their Real Photographs 
Participants 
SAMPLE GROUPS (Newspaper Accounts) 
SUM 
Hürriyet Y. Akit Sözcü BirGün 
F % F % F % F % F % 
Anonymous  11 33.3 13 40.6 11 33.3 12   35.3 47 36.4 
Use Their Real 
Photographs 
22 66.7 19 59.4 22 66.7 22   64.7 85 64.4 
SUM 33 100 32 100 33 100 34 100 132 100 
 
At first glance at Table 3, while roughly one-third of the participants have an 
anonymous profile, remaining 85 participants use their real photographs on their 
profile pages. Table 3 also shows that there is no significant difference between 
Political Symbols (%74.4) Sports Club Symbols (%20.2)
Educational Declarations (%3.8) Vocational Declarations (%1.6)
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sample groups in the means of anonymity; roughly one-third of each sample group 
consists of anonymous participants, and each of the four sample groups shares 
approximately quarters of the anonymous or non-anonymous participants. Turkish 
Twitter users are more prone to navigate this cyber-space with their real faces, names, 
and identities.  
 
As it is mentioned; presentation of the real photographs or the real names does not 
need to mean the presentation or disclosure of the identity, therefore presentation of 
the identity via symbols should also be considered. Here, the symbol categories of the 
study become crucial; as you may recall, the participants who do not have any symbols 
presented before on their profile pages are called as "Participants without Symbols", 
and the remaining participants are called as "Participants with At Least One Symbol." 
Table 4 shows the count of the participants that designed their profile pages with or 
without symbols associatively with the sample groups they have been selected. The 
equality between sample groups that occurred in the anonymity category has been 
broken in the symbol categories.  
 
Table 4. The Participant Count With and Without Symbols 
Participants 
Sample Groups (Newspaper Accounts) 
SUM 
Hürriyet Yeni Akit Sözcü BirGün 
With At Least 
One Symbol 
F 22 28 27 31 108 
% 
20.37 25.93 25.00 28.70 100 
66.67 87.50 81.82 91.18 81.82 
Without 
Symbols 
F 11 4 6 3 24 
% 
45.83 16.67 25.00 12.50 100 
33.33 12.50 18.18 8.82 18.18 
Sum 
F 33 32 33 34 132 
% 100 100 100 100 100 
 
As is seen from Table 4, Roughly one third of the participants that follow Hürriyet's 
Twitter account does not use symbols on their profile pages, on the other hand, 91% of 
the participants that follow Birgün's Twitter account, 87.5% of the participants that 
follow Yeni Akit's Twitter Account, and 81% of the participants that follow Birgün's 
Twitter account, 87.5% of the participants that follow Sözcü's Twitter Account have at 
least one symbol on their profile pages. Almost half of the participants without 
symbols (45.8%) consisted of the followers of Hürriyet's Twitter account. The 
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participants who follow the Twitter account of Hürriyet, which represents a more 
"public" domain, revealed their non-disclosing characters.  
 
While Table 3 and 4 showed that 64.4% of the participants have their real photographs 
and 81.8% of them have at least one "symbol" on their profile pages; Table 5 
approaches these two categories correlatively. The most remarkable finding shown in 
Table 5 is the participants who do not have any symbol on their profile pages mostly 
use their real photographs with a significant ratio of 83.3%. Although these 
participants do not hesitate to disclose their real identities (their real names and faces), 
they do not disclose their personalities, identities, social groups, that is to say, "with 
whom they are together." 
 
Table 5. Anonymity of Participants That Uses Symbols and Without Symbols 
Participants 
Use Their Real 
Photograph 
Anonymous Sum 
F % F % F % 
With At Least One 
Symbol 
65 60.2 43 39.8 108 100 
Without Symbols 20 83.3 4 16.6 24 100 
SUM 85  47  132  
 
Nevertheless, 39.8% of the participants with at least one symbol on their profile pages, 
who disclose their personalities, social groups, "with whom they are together” mostly 
hide their "real" identity. To extend the analysis, participants have also been 
categorized as "Political Stance Declarers", "Sports Club Supporters" and 
"Vocational/Educational Declarers" considering the symbol groups they choose to 
design their profile pages. It should be noted that; Twitter users can use these three 
symbol groups together in their profile pages, therefore, to match each participant 
with a single category; 1- Political symbols are accepted superior to the sports club 
and vocational/educational symbols, and 2- Sports club symbols are accepted superior 
to the vocational/educational symbols. Table 6 shows the participant distribution 
according to the identity categories mentioned above associatively with the sample 
groups they have been selected. 
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Table 6. Distribution of the Participants by Simple Identity Categorization 
Participants 
Sample Groups (Newspaper Accounts) 
Sum 
Hürriyet Y. Akit Sözcü BirGün 
F % F % F % F % F % 
W
it
h
 A
t 
L
e
a
s
t 
O
n
e
 S
y
m
b
o
l 
Political Stance 
Declarers 
14 
42.4 
 
18.2 
22 
68.8 
 
28.6 
20 
60.6 
 
26.0 
20 
58.8 
 
27.3 
76 
57.6 
 
100 
Sports Club 
Supporters 
1 
3.0  
  
6.3 
3 
  9.4  
  
18.7 
4 
12.1  
  
25.0 
8 
23.5  
  
50.0 
16 
12.1  
  
100 
Vocational 
/Educational 
Declarers 
7 
21.3  
  
43.8 
3 
  9.4  
  
18.8 
3 
  9.1  
  
18.8 
3 
  8.8  
  
18.8 
16 
12.1  
  
100 
Without Symbols 11 
 33.3  
  
45.8 
4 
12.5  
  
16.7 
6 
18.2  
  
25.0 
3 
  8.8  
  
12.5 
24 
18.2  
  
100 
Sum 33 100 32 100 33 100 34 100 132 100 
 
In Table 6, it can be seen that more than a half (57.6%) of the participants disclose 
their political stances. More than half of each sample group except Hürriyet newspaper 
consist of political stance declarer participants and the ratio increases in 68% for the 
Yeni Akit sample group. On the other hand, encountering 45.8% of the 
vocational/educational declarer participants among the participants who follow the 
Hürriyet newspaper is remarkable.  
 
Table 7. Anonymity of the Participants by Simple Identity Categorization 
Participants 
With Real Photographs Anonymous Sum 
F % F % F % 
W
it
h
 A
t 
L
e
a
s
t 
O
n
e
 
S
y
m
b
o
l 
Political Stance 
Declarers 
38 50.0 38 50.0 76 100 
Sports Club 
Supporters 
13 81.3 3 18.8 16 100 
Vocational 
/Educational 
Declarers 
14 87.5 2 12.5 16 100 
Without Symbols 20 83.3 4 16.6 24 100 
 
Table 7 approaches anonymity categories and the categories mentioned above 
correlatively. It can be seen that 87.5% of the participants who are 
vocational/educational declarers and 81.3% of the participants who are sports club 
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supporters use their real photographs on their profile pages. In other words, these 
participants seem to disclose both their real -formal- identities and personalities, 
selves, social groups, "with whom they are together" on Twitter's cyber public sphere. 
However, considering vocational/educational declarations determine "status" rather 
than "identity" or community belonging, and supporting a sports club does not 
precisely determine a community (except fanaticism and hooliganism), this finding 
may not be unexpected. Simply put, these participants actually carry their offline 
identities, real faces, names, professions, "hobbies" to online, similar to the Boyd and 
Ellison's narrative, without disclosing their personalities, social groups, communities. 
However, this is reversed for the participants who declares their political stances, as 
shown in Table 7, half of the political stance declarer participants are anonymous. 
These users consider "with whom they are together" more significant than "who they 
are", put their communal or social group identities ahead. Worries of "personality 
disclosure" still seems to be valid for SNSs and particularly for Twitter. When the data 
in Table 7 are calculated, the proportions in Figure 5 emerge. 
 
 
Figure 5. Personality/Identity Disclosure Rates 
 
In figure 5; participants who are not only anonymous but also have at least one symbol 
on their profile pages categorized as "Full Disclosing", participants who are not 
anonymous but have at least one symbol on their profile pages are categorized as 
"Semi-Disclosing", and remaining participants who are not anonymous and do not 
have any symbols on their profile pages are categorized as "Non-Disclosing." As is 
seen, the proportion of participants navigating the "streets of Twitter" with their "social 
masks" is only 3%, however, roughly one third of the participants put the "rigid and still 
community masks" even ahead their own faces, and 80.9% of them have political 
symbols.  
 
Full Disclosing Participants (%32.6)
Semi-Disclosing Participants (%64.4)
Non-Disclosing Participants (%3)
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6.3. Voluntary Ghettoization on Twitter 
In the middle of the 2000's the environment of the internet, similar to the 20th-
century city, got crowded, overflow with the anonymous "strangers", and the users 
chose to become "intimate" and "local" to escape from strangers and alienation as 
Sennett and Bauman claimed. In other words, for the internet users, the "security need" 
mentioned by Alver re-emerged, and the solution was choosing to "live" among the 
similar ones again. As Van Dijk claimed. Seeking for familiarity among the stranger 
means seeking "people of us", and finding those of us could only be possible when 
they disclose "with whom they are", and this process often functions on a symbolic 
domain of profile pages. As revealed in previous chapters, Twitter meticulously chose 
the symbols to disclose themselves. 
 
In this section of the study; according to reveal whether the symbols used by the 
participants on their profile pages attract users that are similar to them, it has been 
examined that how many followers of the participants from different categories use 
similar symbols on their profile pages. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to extend 
the "Political Stance Declarers" category that covers 57.6% of the participants by 
considering different political stances of Turkey such as; "Republican Nationalists", 
"Conservative Nationalists"*, "Mere Nationalists", "Turkish Nationalism and Ethnicity", 
"Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnicity", "Socialists/Anarchists", "Islamic Religionists", and 
to match each participant to a single category according to the multiple symbol groups 
they used. Several examples of multiple symbol user participants categorized as 
"Conservative Nationalists" are shown in Figure 6. 
 
For instance, the participant A18 has both a Turkish Flag and a coat of arm of the 
sports club he/she supports in her/his cover photograph, and also he/she express that 
he/she owns a more conservative political stance by using a Mehmed the Conqueror* 
image in her/his profile photo. The symbolic front designed by A26 that consists of a 
Turkish Flag, an Ottoman Signature, an Oghuz Khan** portrait and the writings of 
"Muslim" and "Turk" is similar to A18's profile page. Table 8 lists the distributions of all 
participants by the categories mentioned above. In Table 8, it is seen that 22.2% of 
participants are Republican Nationalists, and 17.6% of them disclose their Conservative 
                                                            
* Republican Nationalist category includes participants that define themselves as republican, nationalist, 
Kemalist, secular or social democrat, while Conservative Nationalist category includes participants that often 
define themselves as nationalist and religious. Republicans are mostly represented by The Republican 
People's Party, while conservatives are mostly represented by the Justice and Development Party. 
* Fatih Sultan Mehmet or Mehmet II, 7th Ottoman Sultan who conquered Constantinople. 
** Is a legendary and semi-mythological khan of the Turks. 
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Nationalist political stance. These ratios are above all other categories and followed by 
the Sports Club Supporter participants with the ratio of 14.8%. 
 
 
Figure 6. Multiple Symbol Usage Examples by the "Conservative Nationalists" 
 
Another significant finding shown in Table 8 is that the multiple symbol usage in 
almost every political stance declaration category is more common than singular 
symbol usage. In addition, Islamic Religionist participants cover the lowest percentage, 
which means the symbols that refer to Islam religion are often used with the symbols 
that refer to political declarations, especially by the conservative nationalist 
participants. Although not shown in Table 8, distributions of participants through each 
complex identity category have also been analyzed according to the sample groups 
they have been selected from. For instance, 33.3% of the republican nationalist 
participants follow the Sözcü journal and 45.8% of them follow the Birgün newspaper. 
On the other hand, 57.9% of the conservative nationalist participants, roughly one-
third of the Islamic religionist participants, and 42.9% of the participants that have 
been matched with the Turkish nationalism and ethnicity category follow the Yeni Akit 
newspaper. This strict polarization may be acknowledged as another indication of the 
cyber voluntary ghettoization. 
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Table 8. Distributions of Participants by the Complex Identity Categories 
Participants With At Least One Symbol By Complex Identity 
Categories 
Count Percentage 
Republican Nationalists 
Mere Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
symbols 
7 
24 
6.48 
22.2 
Mere Republican People's Party 
symbols 
1 0.93 
Multiple symbol usage that refer 
to category. 
16 14.8 
Mere Nationalists 
Mere Turkish Flag 5 
9 
4.63 
8.33 Multiple symbol usage that refer 
to category. 
4 3.70 
Conservative Nationalists  
Mere Justice and Development 
Party 
2 
19 
1.85 
17.6 Ottomanists 2 1.85 
Multiple symbol usage that refer 
to category. 
15 13.9 
Sports Club Supporters 
Mere the symbols that refer to 
Sports Clubs 
13 
16 
12.0 
14.8 Symbols that refer to Sports 
Clubs and vocational/ 
educational declarations. 
3 2.77 
Socialists, Anarchists 
With vocational/educational declarations. 
8 7.41 
Islamic Religionists 
Mere symbols that refer to Islam 
Religion 
2 
3 
1.85 
2.78 Symbols that refer to Islam 
Religion and vocational/ 
educational declarations. 
1 0.93 
Turkish Nationalism and Ethnicity 7 6.48 
Kurdish Nationalism and Ethnicity 8 7.41 
Mere Vocational Declerations 5 4.63 
Mere Educational Declerations 9 8.33 
Sum 108 100 
 
 
In this part of the study, the sample was not used entirely, and it has been reduced by 
selecting 34 of the participants to make the follower counting easier. This reduction 
has been made by considering the number of the participants matched the complex 
identity categories shown in Table 8. From each category, a minimum of 25% of the 
participants has been selected providing no fewer than 3 participants. Then all 
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followers of the selected participants have been scanned and each of the followers has 
been matched with one of the same complex identity categories, in associated with the 
symbols they use. In addition, "Institutional" category to distinguish institutional and 
corporal accounts, and "Other" category to distinguish the accounts which cannot be 
categorized was added to the follower categorization. Participants' followers consist of 
an average of 12.1% "institutional" and 8.6% "other" accounts. These categories have 
been excluded from the analysis. Table 9 shows the average follower distributions of 
participants do not use politic symbols.  
 
Table 9. Mean Follower Distributions of Participants Do not Use Politic Symbols 
Participants By 
Complex Identity 
Categories 
Follower Counts by Identity Categories 
Politic Followers 
Non-Politic Followers 
SUM 
Common Politic  
Other Politic 
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e
rs
 
V
o
ca
ti
o
n
a
l 
D
e
cl
a
re
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W
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S
y
m
b
o
ls
 
S
U
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Sports Club 
Supporters 
F 37 20 57 29 90 25 23 188 326 412 
% 9.0 4.9 13.8 7.0 21.8 6.1 5.6 45.6 79.1 100 
Vocational/ 
Educational 
Declarers 
F 27 24 51 44 34 42 39 255 370 465 
% 5.8 5.2 11.0 9.5 7.3 9.0 8.4 54.8 79.6 100 
Without Symbols 
F 68 49 117 93 131 73 100 795 1099 1309 
% 5.2 3.7 8.9 7.1 10.0 5.6 7.6 60.7 84.0 100 
Sum 
F 225 166 1795 2186 
% 10.3 7.6 82.1 100 
 
The "common politic" column in Table 9 contains two politic categories which the 
participants are most followed by, and it is remarkable that these categories are the 
same for all non-politic participants. On the other hand, participants do not use politic 
symbols on their profile pages are mostly followed by users who do not also use politic 
symbols with 82.1%. Table 10 shows the average follower distributions of participants 
use politic symbols.   
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Table 10. Mean Follower Distributions of Participants Use Politic Symbols 
Participants By 
Complex 
Identity 
Categories 
Follower Counts By Identity Categories 
Politic Followers 
Non-Politic Followers Sum 
Similar  Other  
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R
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F 193 55 248 58 140 69 43 487 739 1045 
% 18.5 5.3 23.7 5.6 13.4 6.6 4.1 46.6 70.7 100 
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F 308 103 411 118 71 44 13 158 286 815 
% 37.8 12.6 50.4 14.5 8.7 5.4 1.6 19.4 35.1 100 
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F 112 39 151 59 6 32 7 66 111 321 
% 34.9 12.1 47.0 18.4 1.9 10.0 2.2 20.6 34.6 100 
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F 108 43 151 21 5 27 5 159 196 368 
% 29.3 11.7 41.0 5.7 1.4 7.3 1.4 43.2 53.3 100 
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F 60 16 76 32 21 26 27 245 319 427 
% 14.1 3.7 17.8 7.5 4.9 6.1 6.3 57.4 74.7 100 
Sum 
F 1037 288 1651 2976 
% 34.8 9.7 55.6 100 
 
The "Similar Politic" column in Table 10 contains followers from the same politic 
category and the second politic category that the participants are most followed by. 
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Looking at these two categories, the participants have followers that are remarkably 
similar political stances with them. Moreover, unlike the participants who do not use 
politic symbols, political stance declarer participants are mostly followed again by 
political stance declarers. The findings in Tables 9 and 10 are visualized in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7. Mean Follower Distributions of the Participants 
 
As seen in Figure 7, conservative nationalist and Turkish nationalist participants desire 
to "live" in a "secure" political neighborhood (or network), where only the people 
similar to them live, as Alver and Van Dijk claim. It is also obvious that republican 
nationalist and socialist/anarchist participants have regularly "purge" users that declare 
different political stances that follow them, as Bauman noted. Moreover, Kurdish 
nationalist participants both form networks that consist of "familiar" users and "purge" 
strangers. On the contrary, participants who do not disclose their political stances 
"live" among the users who often wear their "social masks", remarkably away from 
ghetto-like networks, where they create "significations" with social interactions 
"naturally." 
 
7. Conclusion  
This study, which perceived the SNSs and Twitter as urban spaces where social 
interactions take place, also perceived the homogeneous networks that the users form 
as “voluntary ghettos” rather than “echo-chambers.” Aiming to describe the 
relationship between “cyber ghettoization” and “self-disclosure”, which is 
acknowledged as disclosure of cultural, political, or ethnic identities by the symbols 
that refer to them, in the study first the symbols encountered are documented, 
therefore, it is determined that the symbols that refer to political stances (i.e. Turkish 
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Flag, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) are commonly used by Turkish users. Thereafter, 
examining the self-disclosure rates, it is revealed that while roughly one-third of the 
users have anonymous profile pages, 81.8% of the users have at least one symbol on 
their profile pages. Finally, when the cyber voluntary ghettos are examined, it is 
obvious that, the participants, who disclose the "political" side of their 
identity/personality, their "intimacy", often chose to be "local", form a kind of voluntary 
ghetto by attracting "familiar" users who have the same political stances with them, 
just as Sennett and Bauman are worried about. For sure, these attempts may also be 
interpreted as "visibility" attempts, since republican and conservative nationalist 
participants try to "excel" or socialist/anarchist and Kurdish nationalist participants 
may be acknowledged as "subaltern" groups. However, in a homogeneous ghetto-like 
network, which is the exact opposite of "public", excellence or visibility struggles 
would be insignificant. On the contrary, the participants who do not disclose their 
political stances, "live" remarkably away from ghetto-like networks where they create 
"significations" by social interactions.  
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